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CLAIM ACCRUAL UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT: WHEN SHOULD CLAIMANTS FILE
SUIT AGAINST THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION FOR TORT LIABILITY?
We want the victim, if there is a victim, to be protected. He is
protected with this type of legislation,probably better than if he had to rely
on collecting money from a career agent, certainly better than if he had to
rely on collectingfrom a careeragent.1
-William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
The process for filing an administrative claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act 2 ("FTCA") against the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") requires claimants to comply precisely with its statutory provisions
and administrative requirements. 3 Unfortunately, for many claimants, such
a process often results in complications due to procedural technicalities. 4
The two-year statute of limitations, based upon a claimant's claim accrual

date, often causes issues because of the difficulty of determining the exact
date of the injury.5 For many families of the victims of Winterhill Gang
members and FBI informants James "Whitey" Bulger and Stephen Flemmi,
determining the date claimants
should have known they had claims against
6
difficult.
very
proved
FBI
the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
GovernmentalRelations of the Comm. on the Judiciary,H.R., 95th Cong. 104 (1978) (statement
of Hon. William H. Webster, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2671-2680 (2006).
3 See id.
4 See id. (listing procedural requirements); 28 C.F.R. § 14 (2009) (detailing procedural
requirements prescribed by Attorney General); Donald N. Zillman, Presentinga Claim Under the
FederalTort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REv. 961, 962 (1983) (suggesting both claimants and United
States suffer due to statutory requirements of filing initial claim).
5 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 113 (1979) (determining claim accrual date for
different injuries and claims).
6 See Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 450 (1st Cir. 2005) (instructing of plaintiff by
FBI agents to "not rely on newspapers accounts" because reports inaccurate); McIntyre v. United
States, 367 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2004) (discovering McIntyre's body in makeshift grave fifteen
years after his murder). James "Whitey" Bulger, born and raised in South Boston, Massachusetts,
developed a drug trafficking and racketeering empire in South Boston. See Richard Chacon,
Three Reputed Mobsters Have Longstanding Ties to Each Other, BOs. GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1995, at
11. Bulger employed many individuals to assist him in performing dangerous jobs. See id.
Stephen "The Rifleman" Flemmi grew up in Roxbury, Massachusetts. See id. Flemmi's skill in
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Most individuals would not initially believe the FBI's possible
7
involvement in the murders and crimes committed against their families.
In several decisions by the First Circuit Court of Appeals concerning FTCA
claims against the FBI for their involvement with the actions of Bulger and
Flemmi, the court found the claims untimely.8 The court reasoned that the
claimants should have known about the information supporting their claims
at an earlier date. 9
Established for the purpose of providing individuals wronged by

government agencies a process for adjudicating claims against the United
States government, the FTCA effectively serves as a waiver of sovereign
immunity. 10
The FTCA requires claimants to fully exhaust the
administrative remedies available through the statute before invoking the
judicial process." However, many claimants encounter procedural issues
during the administrative claims process, which forces them to litigate the
procedural issues of administrative claims.12
Part I of this Note discusses the intentions and goals of the federal
government that relate to what the government hopes to achieve through
the FTCA. 13 Part II explains the process for filing an administrative claim
against a federal agency under the FTCA. 14 Finally, the Note specifically
explores a pattern of "claim accrual date" issues in several decisions by the
marksmanship while serving as an Army paratrooper in the Korean War earned him "The
Rifleman" nickname. See id.In the 1970s, Flemmi and Bulger joined forces as members of the
Winter Hill Gang in Somerville, Massachusetts. Id.
7 See Letter to the Editor, FBI Reacts to Mafia Coverage, BoS. HERALD, July 14, 1997, at 36
(reporting likely potential of illicit FBI involvement with mafia). Barry W. Mawn, FBI Special
Agent in Charge of the Boston field office, wrote that "[a] number of allegations of misconduct
by FBI agents are from a co-defendant of a pending federal racketeering case. Other allegations
of tip-offs are from anonymous law enforcement sources or former law enforcement officials
whose knowledge is questionable or speculative." Id.
8 See Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 625 (1st Cir. 2011); Patterson v. United
States, 451 F.3d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 2006); Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7, 24 (1st Cir. 2006);
Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 455 (1st Cir. 2005); McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d

38, 58 (1st Cir. 2004).
9 Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117-18 (developing standard for measuring claim accrual date to
determine whether FTCA claim timely).
10 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2671-2680 (2006). "The United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances .... 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
11See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1993) (dismissing FTCA suit because
claimant failed to exhaust administrative remedies and requirements).
12 See id.; Zillman, supra note 4, at 962 (identifying numerous procedural issues encountered
by FTCA claimants).
13 See infra notes 18, 25, 30 and accompanying text (explaining purpose of FTCA claims
process articulated through statutes and congressional reports).
14 See discussion infra Part II.A (detailing procedural requirements and steps
for FTCA
claimants and administrative agencies in FTCA claims process).
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First Circuit Court of Appeals.' 5 The cases consist of a string of FTCA
claims filed against the FBI in connection with the informant relationship
between the FBI's Boston field office and Winterhill Gang members James
"Whitey" Bulger and Stephen Flemmi.' 6 The outcome and reasoning of the

cases suggest that claimants must carefully construct an administrative
claim under the FTCA by determining whether to list multiple legal
theories, because the court may decide to either consider each theory
separately, or find accrual based on only one theory if it finds the claimant
could access information supporting that theory.17
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
In 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA as part of a group of
legislation under sections 401-424 of the Legislative Reorganization Act
("LRA"). 18 Through the LRA, Congress intended to waive governmental
immunity from tort suits and allow individuals to bring tort claims against
the United States for alleged negligence of government employees. 19
Additionally, the heads of government agencies received the authority to
settle tort claims not exceeding $1000.20 Claimants with tort claims below
or exceeding $1000 could file directly in federal court. 2' Congress created
15 See discussion infra Part II.D (identifying First Circuit's method of evaluation for
measuring claim accrual dates of FTCA claims).
16 See, e.g., Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 616 (1st Cir. 2011); Pattersonv. United

States, 451 F.3d 268, 269 (1st Cir. 2006); Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 2006);
Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 446 (1st Cir. 2005); McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d
38, 40 (1st Cir. 2004); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (2009) ("A claim shall be presented to the
Federal agency whose activities gave rise to the claim.").
17 See infra notes 102, 113 (discussing First Circuit's evaluation of legal theories of FTCA
claimants injured by FBI's informant relationship).
18See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-24, 60 Stat. 812,
843-44 (1946) (giving tort claimants the opportunity to pursue remedies against the United
States); S. REP. No.79-1400, at 29-34 (1946) (articulating need for individuals to file tort claims
against United States).
19 See S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 29, 31 (removing government employee from suit and
inserting government employer, the United States).
20 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 403, 60 Stat. 812, 843-44
(1946) (requiring claimants to file directly with administrative agency if claim for $1000 or less).
After filing a claim with an agency, a claimant must wait for the agency to make a final
disposition before filing in court, or a claimant must give the agency fifteen days notice in writing
of claim withdrawal. Id. A claimant may choose whether to pursue claims of $1000 or less
through the agency or federal court. Id. In 1959, Congress increased the claim amount for the
adjustment of claims by administrative agencies to $2500. Pub. L. No. 86-238, § 2, 73 Stat. 471,
472 (1959). The Senate wished to increase the amount to $3000. S. REP. No. 86-797, at 2
(1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2272, 2273.
21 See § 403, 60 Stat. at 843-44 (allowing FTCA claimants option of filing directly with
agency or pursuing claim immediately in court).
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the FTCA to establish a uniform system for authorizing individuals to bring
suits in tort against the United States.22 The FTCA also established
procedures for the administrative adjustment of claims by governmental
. 23

agencies.

Congress amended the FTCA in 1966.24
Congress primarily
intended for the amendments to increase the authority of government
agencies to consider tort claims. 25 Before any claims can move to litigation
in the federal courts, agencies must consider claims according to
regulations established by the Attorney General. 26
The amendments
implemented the mandatory process of filing an administrative claim with a
government agency before a claimant can file an action against the United
States in federal court.2 7 Filing directly with the government agency
provides the agency notice of the claim and the opportunity to investigate
that claim. 28 The amendments further clarified the practical process a
claimant must follow in filing an administrative claim against a
government agency. 29 Collectively, Congress intended for the amendments
to ease court congestion, avoid unnecessary litigation, and expedite fair

22

See S. REP. No. 79-1400, at 29, 31; see also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S.

543, 549-50 (1951) (discussing Congress's intent to change procedures to allocate more time for
major public issues); Zillman, supra note 4, at 965 (listing FTCA virtues of helping overburdened
courts and offering non-complex settlement of claims).
23 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing procedures and benefits yielded by
Congress's creation of FTCA system).
24 See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520-22
(explaining amendments to procedures and requirements of FTCA); H.R. REP. No. 89-1532, at 36 (1966) (discussing amendments to FTCA).
25 See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2516 (presenting goals
of FTCA amendments); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 6; Zillman, supra note 4, at 966-67
(explaining 1966 amendments required claimants to deal with administrative agency before any
court action). Congress wanted to use the amendments to encourage more settlements between
claimants and agencies without the use of the courts. Zillman, supra note 4, at 966-67.
26 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-.11 (2011) (detailing requirements for administrative claims against
federal agencies under the FTCA).
27 See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2517-18 (requiring
FTCA claimants file with specific agency of alleged liability because agency "directly
concerned"); H.R. REP. No. 89-1532, at 7.
28 S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2517-18 ("[An] agency
would have the best infornation concerning the activity which gave rise to the claim ....
[M]eritorious claims can be settled more quickly without the need for filing suit and possible
expensive and time-consuming litigation."); H.R. REP. No. 89-1532, at 7.
29 S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 4, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2518 (simplifying language
in § 2401 requirements to file claim); H.R. REP. No. 89-1532, at 8. Section 7 of the amendments
simplified the language in the requirements of § 2401 for filing a claim in writing within two
years after the claim accrues. Id. It also requires that for a claimant to file in federal court, he or
she must do so within six months after the agency makes a final decision on that claim. Id.
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settlements for claimants against the government.30
Congress considered the prerequisite procedure present in many
state statutes, which required claimants to file an administrative claim prior
to filing suit in court for tort claims against state governments and
municipalities. 31 According to the Justice Department, a procedure that
would require claimants to present to the specific government agency their
claim of alleged negligent action would yield great productivity, because
that agency would have the best access to the information of the activity or
event that gave rise to the claim. 32 Additionally, an agency would
likely
33
have great interest in settling the claim depending upon liability.
The amendments increased the claim amount of the tort claims that
agencies had the authority to settle before assuming litigation costs and
appearing in federal court.34 Agency heads received the authority to settle

claims up to $25,000, while claims exceeding that amount require prior
written approval by the Attorney General.35 By increasing the claim
amount from $2500 to $25,000, administrative agencies can make
meaningful settlements without requiring the involvement of the courts.3 6
30 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 2, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2516; H.R. REP. NO. 89-

1532, at 6. Data showed that a large number of cases against the government were being settled
prior to trial, specifically tort claims against the Post Office, the Defense Department, the
Veteran's Administration, the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Aviation Agency, and
Congress, therefore, recognized that the concentration of claims against these agencies led
agencies to develop their own expertise in tort litigation. S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 5, reprintedin
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2519; H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 9.
31 See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 3-4, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2517-18 ("[T]o protect
the municipality from the expense of needless litigation, give it an opportunity for investigation,
and allow it to adjust differences and settle claims without suit." (citing 18A MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.153 (3d rev. ed. 1977))); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 7.
32 See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 n.7 (1993) (explaining agency interest and
efficiency possible through required FTCA procedures); S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 3, reprinted in
1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2515, 2517; H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 7 (focusing on agency interest in
settling or handling claim without litigation).
33 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing reasons agencies better equipped
and interested in handling administrative claims).
34 H.R. REP. 1532, supra note 24, at 5; S. REP. 1327, supra note 24, at 9,reprintedin 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2518.
31 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 6,reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2520 ("If a satisfactory
arrangement cannot be reached in the matter, the claimant can simply do as he does today file
suit."); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 8.
36 See S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2518 (recognizing
agency settlement of substantial tort claims); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1532, at 7-8. Congress decided
that agency settlement allows "greater attention to those cases which involve difficult legal and
damage questions in such areas as medical malpractice, drug and other products liability, and
aviation accidents." S. REP. NO. 89-1327, at 6, reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2518; see also
Zillman, supra note 4, at 967 (highlighting Congress's recognition of importance of FTCA
claimants working seriously with administrative agencies); Shahan J. Kapitanyan Note, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Presentment Requirement: Minimal Notice Sufficient to Pass Legal
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II. FTCA CLAIM PROCEDURES
A. CurrentProceduralRequirementsfor FTCA Claims

The statutory requirements for filing a tort claim against a
government agency require claimants to present an administrative claim to
the specific federal agency before bringing suit in court.3 7 The regulations
for the procedures for filing an administrative claim prescribed by the
Attorney General contain more detailed specifications.3 8 The regulations

specify who can present a claim; when, where, and how to present a claim;
and what to submit to the specific government agency.39 There is no
specification of the particular type of documentation required for filing an
administrative claim, only that the claim supplies all the required and
necessary information in writing. 40 After filing the administrative claim
with the appropriate agency, a claimant must wait six months, or until
receipt of an agency settlement offer or final denial letter, before bringing
suit in federal court. 41
The regulations created by the Attorney General allow for agencies
to create their own rules, policies, and regulations for handling
administrative claims within their specific agency. 42 For example, within
the FBI, legal advisors employed by the agency evaluate claims filed under
the FTCA.43 A Principal Legal Advisor ("PLA") examines administrative
claims filed against the FBI. 44 For those that comply with statutory and
procedural regulations, the PLA either denies the claim or proposes a

Muster andPreserve the Right to File a Subsequent Lawsuit in FederalCourt, 35 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 145, 152-53 (2001) (outlining steps of administrative agency in FTCA claims process).
37 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401, 2671-2680 (2006) (outlining elements of lawsuit).
31 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-.11 (2011) (outlining elements of administrative claim).
39 See id.
40 See id. § 14.2(a) (requiring written claim); Kapitanyar supra note 36, at 154 (explaining
claimants encouraged to use Standard Form 95); Zillman, supra note 4, at 969 (noting Standard
Form 95 popular among claimants, but not required). See generally DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OMB NO.
1105-0008, STANDARD FORM 95 (2007).
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (requiring agency make decision before claimant may file in federal
court); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (requiring claimant file suit within six months after agency
disposition of claim). A claimant may bring suit in the federal judicial district in which the
claimant resides or where the negligent act occurred. See 28 U.S.C. 1402(b) (2006).
42 See 28 C.F.R. § 14.11 ("Each agency is authorized to issue regulations and establish
procedures consistent with the regulations in this part.").
43 See Kevin Corr, The Role of the FBI PrincipalLegal Advisor, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 157,
158-59 (1994). The FBI employs agents as Principal Legal Advisors ("PLAs") for each of the
main field office divisions. Id. at 157. PLAs review any administrative claims filed by claimants
against the FBI and its agents. Id. at 159.
44 See id.
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payment for the claim. 45 The PLA considers administrative claims filed
against the agency under section 2672 of the FTCA in determining whether
to deny the claim or offer a settlement.46
As stated above, under the FTCA, a claimant cannot bring suit in
federal court until all administrative remedies have been exhausted.47 An
agency must fully dispose of a claim before exclusive jurisdiction vests in
United States federal court to decide the liability of the claim. 48 Despite the
prescribed process and rules under the federal statutes for filing tort claims
against government agencies, and the benefits achieved to ease court
congestion through the 1966 amendments, several issues in the
administrative claims procedure often require litigation in federal court.49
B. Judicial/JurisdictionalTreatment of FTCA Claims
The FTCA's two-year statute of limitations begins to run starting

on the claim accrual date.50

The statutory requirements require strict

compliance for filing an administrative claim against a government
agency. 5' If a claimant fails to meet the procedural statute of limitations
requirement, the claimant forever loses the opportunity to seek relief or

45 See id. (offering claim settlement if FBI at fault or denying claim if FBI not at fault); 28

C.F.R. §§ 14.9-.11 (providing agencies authorization to issue "regulations and establish
procedures" following existing federal regulations).
46 See 28 C.F.R § 14.4 (indicating the evidence a claimant "may be required to submit" to an
agency).
47 McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1993) (finding congressional intent behind
§ 2675(a) requires complete exhaustion of administrative remedies before invoking judicial
process).
48 See 28 U.S.C. § 2672; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2(c), 14.9(b). If a claimant files the tort
claim in federal court before the agency makes its final disposition, according to the statutory and
regulatory requirements, the court will immediately dismiss the suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2672.
49 See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112-13 (dismissing FTCA suit because claimant failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and requirements); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18
(1979) (determining how to measure claim accrual and statute of limitations); Zillman, supra note
4, at 962 (finding over 250 cases before federal courts considering statutory and regulatory
procedures required under FTCA). Zillman questions whether Congress created statutory
obstacles that allow administrative agencies and courts to read complexities into the FTCA
beyond Congress's original intent, because procedural requirements of the FTCA limit having
claims heard on the basis of the merits. Id. Zillman believes that a balance needs to exist
between how both the claimant and government parties' interests are considered. Id.
'0 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006) (beginning statute of limitations when plaintiff's claim
accrues because of knowledge of government liability); Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (explaining 28
U.S.C. § 2401(b) acts as "limitations provision" meant to encourage prompt claim settlements).
" See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113 (addressing when "claim accrual date" occurs under the
FTCA).

42

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

justice for their claim.52 Under the traditional rule for FTCA
claim accrual,
53
injury.
s
plaintiff
the
of
date
the
on
accrue
to
begins
a claim
In United States v. Kubrick,54 the Supreme Court created a
"discovery rule" for assessing the claim accrual date of an FTCA claim for
medical malpractice cases. 55 The Court held that a claim accrues when the
plaintiff knows of both the existence and the cause of his injury.56 The
Court enforced the adherence to the statute of limitations requirement
because the provision ensures that the "government is promptly presented
with a claim while the evidence is still fresh,
[and the evidence] is to be
57

strictly construed in the government's favor.
Many of the United States Courts of Appeals use the discovery rule
in non-malpractice cases "where plaintiffs face comparable problems in
discerning the fact and cause of their injuries. 5 8 Specifically, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the use of the discovery rule beyond the
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented
in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues
or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.
Id.

53 See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120; Attallahv. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st Cir. 1992);
Gonzalez-Bernal v. United States, 907 F.2d 246, 249 (1st Cir. 1990).
54 44 U.S. 111 (1979).
" See id. at 119-20.

See id. at 123 (creating discovery rule exception for medical malpractice cases). A
claimant no longer lies at the mercy of the government once he or she is armed with knowledge
of the fact of injury and the identity of the parties that caused the injury. Id.at 123. Congress
intended the statute of limitations to "require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims."
56

Id.

57 Pattersonv. United States, 451 F.3d 268, 270 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Kubrick, 444 U.S. at
117-18. Compare Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1270 (7th Cir. 1980) (applying
Kubrick to find accrual date after medical opinion of causal connection), with Waits v. United
States, 611 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Kubrick to find accrual occurred when
hospital released records to claimant indicating malpractice). See generally Zillman, supra note
4, at 984 (discussing Waits application of Kubrick to claim accrual appears less persuasive than
Stoleson).

58 Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1982); see Garza v. U.S. Bureau of
Prisons, 284 F.3d 930, 934 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying expanded use of discovery rule); Diaz v.
United States, 165 F.3d 1337, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (expanding use of discovery rule to include
wrongful death case); Gould v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 743 (4th
Cir. 1990) (applying Kubrick discovery rule to FTCA claim accrual analysis); Drazan v. United
States, 762 F.2d 56, 60 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing plaintiff to show he had no reason to believe
government caused injury). But see Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding wrongful death claims accrue only from date of death).
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medical malpractice context.5 9 The court uses the discovery rule when
evaluating
the plaintiffs legal theory or theories articulated in the FTCA
60
claim.
C. Case Study: FTCA Claims Against the FBI
A series of cases in the First Circuit Court of Appeals involving
FTCA claims against the FBI, which arose from the actions of confidential
informants James "Whitey" Bulger and Stephen Flemmi, dealt directly
with the administrative claim procedures of the FTCA. 61 Specifically, the
procedural requirement of the claim accrual date, and the statute of
limitations of FTCA claims, required judicial decision. 62
In its
determinations, the First Circuit applied the discovery rule established by
United States v. Kubrick to determine a claim accrual date .63
The First Circuit begins its analysis by using the date of the
plaintiffs administrative complaint to determine the claim accrual date .64
Plaintiffs list specific legal theories of tort liability by the FBI in their
administrative complaint.65 Using the plaintiffs legal theory or theories,
the court inquires into what the plaintiff "should have known. ,66 The
59 See Skwira v.United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying discovery rule to
wrongful death action). The court adapted the discovery rule from the medical malpractice
context to measure FTCA claim accrual as "once a plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should know, (1) of her injury and (2) sufficient facts to permit a reasonable
person to believe that there is a causal connection between the government and her injury." Id.at
78; Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 780 (1st Cir. 1992) (using Kubrick discovery rule as
exception to general rule for FTCA claims accrual).
60 See, e.g., Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 625-28 (1st Cir. 2011) (evaluating
accrual date of plaintiffs' administrative claims); Patterson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268, 270-73
(1st Cir. 2006) (measuring claim accrual date to determine statute of limitations); Rakes v. United
States, 442 F.3d 7, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding claim accrual analysis necessary to determine
applicability of statute of limitations); Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 451 (1st Cir.
2005) (using accrual analysis to determine status of claim); Mclntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d
38, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2004) (using claim accrual standard to evaluate plaintiffs' claims).
61 See, e.g., Donahue, 634 F.3d at 625-28; Patterson, 451 F.3d at 270; Rakes, 442 F.3d at 1920; Callahan,426 F.3d at 451; McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 51-52.
62 See supra note 61 (listing First Circuit cases requiring judicial decision on procedural
issues of FTCA claims).
63 See supra note 61 (listing cases where First Circuit applied "discovery rule" to determine
claim accrual dates).
64 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 623 (identifying date administrative claim filed for purposes
of
evaluating claim accrual).
65 See id.
at 625 (using plaintiff's theory of liability to determine when to begin accrual
measurement).
66 Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20 (asking objectively what plaintiff "should have knowif'). InRakes,
the court found a reasonable person will learn of certain information through "the channels of
communication that run among people connected through ties of neighborhood, community,
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inquiry begins by first determining what generally available information of
the relevant facts the court should charge the plaintiff with having
knowledge of concerning the claim. 67
Then, an objective inquiry
determines whether a plaintiff who knew at least "that much" information
would further investigate, and what such an investigation would likely

reveal. 68 In some cases, the court uses a five-factor test to evaluate the
facts of a given case for determining a claim accrual date under the
discovery rule. 6 9 The court applies the five-factor test objectively and
breaks apart the two components of the initial inquiry for more particular
evaluation.70
The First Circuit conducts the claim accrual analysis of a plaintiff s
legal theories without a precise rule for the consideration of the effect of
multiple legal theories. 71 When a plaintiffs claim includes multiple legal
theories of FBI liability, the court evaluates a plaintiffs administrative
complaint differently on a case-by-case basis.72 After determining which
friendship, and family." Id. at 23.
67 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 624; Patterson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268, 270 (1st Cir.
2006); see also Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 451 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating actual
knowledge of injury and its cause unnecessary); Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir.
2003) (finding something less than "definitive knowledge" sufficient to begin claim accrual).
68 Donahue, 634 F.3d at 624; Patterson, 451 F.3d at 270; Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20; Callahan,
426 F.3d at 451; McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2004).
69 See McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 52 (using Kubrick discovery rule in five-factor analysis);
see
infra note 70 (listing five factors of test).
70 McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 52. The first factor asks whether sufficient facts were available to
provoke a reasonable person in the claimant's circumstance to inquire or investigate further. Id.
Secondly, "[a] claim does not accrue when a person has a mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or rumor
of a claim, but such suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible existence of a
claim in the exercise of due diligence." Id. (quoting Kronish v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121
(2d Cir. 1998)). Third, if a duty to inquire is established, the plaintiff is charged with the
knowledge of what he or she would have uncovered through a reasonably diligent search. Id.
Fourth the court evaluates whether, after possession of the infornation from an investigation, the
plaintiff would know enough to permit a reasonable person to believe that she had been injured
and that a causal connection exists between the injury and the government's action. Id. Finally,
definitive knowledge by the claimant is not required, and each inquiry is highly fact- and casespecific. Id.
71 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 21 (finding inquiry requires circumstantial determination); see also
Donahue, 634 F.3d at 624 (reaffirming Rakes analysis of FTCA legal theories because "cases
cannot be analyzed in the abstract"). The court in Rakes reasoned that "[w]hether a court will
need to make separate calculations as to timeliness for different theories of injury pertaining to a
single set of facts, or can simply rely on the accrual date of the earliest accruing theory, depends
very much on the circumstances of the case." 442 F.3d at 21.
72 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20-21(considering whether rule exists in method of evaluating legal
theories). The court cautioned that "[n]either McIntyre nor Callahan should be viewed as setting
forth a flat rule, or even a generally applicable rule subject to an easily stated exception." Id. at
21. Compare McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 54, 57-58 (articulating two legal theories but only
considering plaintiff's first theory), with Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452 (holding claim accrues when
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legal theory or theories to use in the accrual analysis, the court considers
the factors of the information available to the plaintiff that supports the
presented legal theories.7 Based on the court's findings of the availability
of information relevant to the plaintiffs legal theories, the court asks
"whether a plaintiff who knew at least that much would have made a
further investigation,
and what such an investigation would likely have
74
revealed. ,
Evaluation of the claim accrual dates for FTCA claimants with
claims against the FBI involving informants Bulger and Flemmi turned on
the amount of media information available about the FBI and its
relationship with Bulger and Flemmi. 5
Media publication of the
connections of the FBI informant relationship to murders and extortion
created enough information
to begin the claim accrual dates for many
76
FTCA claimants.
D. FBI Cases
In McIntyre v. United States,77 the First Circuit found that it could
not reasonably expect the plaintiff to have discovered facts to support the
theory of her claim until after the date that would warrant a violation of the
statute of limitations.7 8 Specifically, the court identified a "rumor" as the

information vital to any theory of liability emerges).
" See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20 (explaining process of considering factors); McIntyre, 367 F.3d
at 52 (looking for facts available to plaintiff).
74 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20, 22-23 (identifying information available to plaintiffs and
expecting plaintiffs' knowledge of such information); McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 52, 55-56 (finding
plaintiffs unable to know information to cause claim to accrue before date in question).
75 See, e.g., Donahue, 634 F.3d at 626 (determining whether media information conclusive
and persuasive at relevant time for accrual); Patterson, 451 F.3d at 271, 273 (finding murder
highly publicized by media attention especially though newspaper); Rakes, 442 F.3d at 22-23
(focusing on number of Boston newspaper articles); Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452-53 (considering
local Boston and national media coverage both in newspapers and television news networks);
McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 48-49 (examining newspapers printed in city of murder and CBS 60
Minutes interview).
76 Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452-54 (holding plaintiff should have discovered facts giving rise to
claim earlier because facts publicized). The FBI agents' alleged fraudulent concealment of their
knowledge concerning who had committed murder could not toll the limitations period for a
FTCA suit beyond the point when the organized crime figure pled to murder. Id. at 454.
77 367 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2004).
78 Id. at 54 (finding claim accrued only when FBI disclosed victim's informant status).
McIntyre served as an informant for the Quincy Police Department. Id. at 42. He disappeared
after relaying information to his handler about the attempted delivery of guns and ammunition
from Massachusetts to the Irish Republican Army in Ireland, which involved Bulger and Flemmi.
Id. at 42-43. The Quincy Police Department contacted the FBI with the information. Id. Shortly
thereafter, the plaintiff's son disappeared, and she filed several missing persons complaints. Id. at

46

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

basis of knowledge for the FBI's wrongdoing. 79 Based on a rumor, "the
Mclntyres did not have a reasoned basis to believe that it was the FBI that
leaked McIntyre's identity as informant to Bulger and Flemmi." 0 The
rumor could not serve as the claimant's only basis to controvert the FBI's
denial of wrongdoing. 8'
In a case consolidated with McIntyre, the First Circuit found that
the claimants' FTCA claim accrual date exceeded the statute of
limitations.82 The court found that information available to the claimants
through the public media supported the claimants' legal theory for their
FTCA claim.83 The court considered the available information sufficient to
put the claimants on notice for purposes of identifying the claim accrual
date .84
Similarly, in Callahan v. United States,85 the widow of a murder
victim filed an FTCA administrative claim against the FBI, alleging that
the FBI's improper relationship with informants led to the murder of her
husband.86 As to the issue of establishing a claim accrual date, media
43. The plaintiff stated by affidavit that the government told her that her son "was a fugitive."
Id.After a series of newspaper articles theorizing the FBI's involvement in McIntyre's murder,
the revelations from Judge Wolf's 260-page opinion of United States v. Salemme, and the
discovery of McIntyre's body, the plaintiff filed an administrative claim against the FBI. Id.at
43-47.

Id. at 55 (focusing on "rumor" as plaintiff's hint of FBI wrongdoing).
The court explained that the claimant's knowledge of Bulger and Flemmi's
responsibility for the murder did not fully support the basis for her claim against the FBI. Id.at
54; see also United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 215 (D. Mass. 1999) (stating that
information concerning events could not be fully resolved in opinion), rev 'd in part sub nom.
United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000).
79

80 Id.at 55.

81 See McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 55.
82 Id.at 59-61. The Wheeler decision

was on consolidated appeal with McIntyre. Id.at 42.
After firing John Callahan from World Jai Alai, Roger Wheeler was shot in his car in the parking
lot of a Tulsa country club. Id.
at 48. Wheeler believed John Callahan, the president of World Jai
Alai, engineered profit skimming for members of Bulger's Winter Hill Gang. Id.The plaintiff
filed a tort claim against the FBI after numerous articles, media specials, and the Salemme
proceedings shed light on the FBI's relationship with informants Bulger and Flemmi. Id.at 4851.
83 Id. at 58-59 (finding claimant had access to all three elements necessary to support FTCA
claim). The claimant's legal theory did not depend on any direct relationship between Wheeler
and the FBI. Id.at 59.
84 Id. (finding necessary information for FTCA claim available through news articles and 60
Minutes). The infornation available to the claimant provided the necessary information about the
FBI's informant relationship with Bulger and Flemmi. Id.at 60-62.
85 426 F.3d 444 (1st Cir. 2005).
86 Id.at 446. The plaintiff s husband, John Callahan, served as CEO of the company World
Jai Alai. Id.at 447. Callahan became suspicious that individuals were skimming profits from the
company. Id. To prevent Callahan from discovering the profit skimming, Bulger and Flemmi

ordered a Winter Hill Gang member to kill Callahan. Id.Authorities discovered Callahan's body
in the trunk of a car at the Miami airport. Id.at 448.
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coverage determined the time when the claimant should have reasonably
had the knowledge necessary to file a claim under the FTCA.8 7 In
Patterson v. United States,88 the First Circuit found the claim untimely
because the claimant should have reasonably acquired information about
the FBI's involvement at least two years before filing the claim.89
Similarly, extortion victims sued the FBI under the FTCA in Rakes v.
United States,90 claiming that the FBI shielded informants who acted as
extortionists. 9 1 Again, the court found the claim untimely because the
claimants should have been aware at an earlier time of information that
would have caused speculation and investigation.92
In Donahue v. United States,93 the First Circuit identified the two
theories of liability permeating through the series of FTCA claims against
the FBI because of their relationship with Bulger and Flemmi.9 4 The first
Id. at 452-53. National television broadcasts on CNN and 60 Minutes, numerous articles
published in Boston newspapers, the publication of Judge Wolf's decision in United States v.
Salemme, and the published FBI agent testimony from Salemme, all provided the claimant with
necessary infornation for an FTCA claim against the FBI. Id. at 453. Judge Wolf's Salemme
opinion included details of the corrupt relationship between the FBI and informants Bulger and
Flemmi. Id. at 449-50. Boston newspapers immediately reported the details of Wolf's opinion.
17

Id. at 450.
88 451 F.3d 268 (1st Cir. 2006).

89 Id. at 273. Vincent Flemmi and Joseph Barboza, two FBI informants, murdered Edward
"Teddy" Deegan in March of 1965. Id. at 269. The FBI knew of the informants' plans before
they murdered Deegan, but did not prevent the murder. Id. Moreover, despite possessing
information about the murder, the FBI did not stop the wrongful convictions of two other men.
Id. The plaintiffs, Deegan's daughters, filed an administrative claim against the FBI. Id. The
factor of a claimant's retirement during that time period did not constitute an excuse for lack of
knowledge. Id. More persuasive, the Boston Globe published an article about the victim's
murder the day after the murder occurred, and the Globe had interviewed the claimant. Id.
90 442 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2006).
91 Id. at 11. Bulger and Flemmi successfully extorted the plaintiffs to sell them their liquor
store. Id. Bulger and two other men made two attempts to take the plaintiffs' store, and on the
second attempt, went to the plaintiffs' home. Id. at 13. Inside, the men displayed weapons on the
kitchen table and threatened to kill the plaintiffs. Id. While holding the plaintiffs' one-year-old
daughter, Flemmi stated that "it would be a shame for her not to see her father again." Id. After
repeated attempts by Bulger to take the store, the plaintiffs contacted a relative in the Boston
Police Department to contact the FBI. Id. Bulger returned to the plaintiffs and told them to have
their police contact "back off," suggesting the FBI informant tipped-off Bulger of the police
contact. Id.
92 Id. at 24 (finding reasonable individual would have known they were injured and
injury
caused by the government). The court found that the claimants' lack of investigation into their
speculated claim caused them to lose their right to pursue an FTCA claim, because the claim
would have accrued earlier, and the statute of limitations therefore prohibited an FTCA claim. Id
at 26-27.
9' 634 F.3d 615 (1st Cir. 2011).
94 Id. at 625 (considering two theories of FBI liability for accrual analysis). The FBI
declined Brian Halloran's offer to provide information about Bulger and Flemmi's involvement
in Wheeler's murder. Id. at 618. Instead, Agent John Connolly leaked Halloran's identity to
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theory, named the "emboldening" theory, posits that the FBI placed a
protective
and Flemmi that allowed them "carte
blance
to shield
ommitaround " Bulger
,95
The second theory, known as the "leak"
blanche to commit crimes.
theory, supposes that the FBI engaged in wrongful disclosures of
government informant identities to Bulger and Flemmi. 96 The court
measured the claimants' accrual dates using the case-by-case approach
applied in Rakes.97 Based on information generally available to the
claimants, the court determined the accrual date. 98 The court found the
information sufficient to "trigger accrual," and, therefore, did not need to
inquire further into what the information would have revealed to the
claimants 99
III. PROCEDURAL AMBIGUITY IN THE COURTS
FTCA claimants follow a regimented procedure for filing FTCA
claims against the government.l°° Ambiguity in how the court will analyze
a claimant's theory or theories of liability adds to the technicalities of
procedure already demanded from claimants." The First Circuit refuses to
apply a precise rule in evaluating a claimant's FTCA claim; accordingly,
the court reserves the right to determine on a case-by-case basis which of
the plaintiffs presented legal theories
to consider, or, as it appears in
1 2
McIntyre, to consider only one theory. 0

Bulger and Flemmi. Id. One night, Halloran asked his neighbor, Michael Donahue, for a ride
home, and Bulger's car pulled alongside and fired a series of shots that killed Donahue
immediately. Id. Additionally, Halloran later died during the ambulance ride. Id. Next, FBI
Agents Connolly and Morris actively sought to prevent other FBI offices from solving the
Wheeler and Callahan murders. Id. at 618-19. The agents gave information to Bulger and
Flemmi about pending investigations, failed to file infornation provided by Halloran, and
prevented interviews of Bulger and Flemmi and the release of any information to the
Massachusetts police concerning Bulger's involvement in the Halloran and Donahue murders. Id.
at 619.
9' See id. at 625.
96 See id.; McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38, 54 (1st Cir. 2004).
97 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 625 (using mode of analysis clarified in Rakes turning on
particular circumstances of case).
98 Id. at 625-26 (considering information from Boston newspapers, coverage by national and
local media, and Agent Morris's testimony).
99 Id. at 627 (deciding media and testimony information satisfied plaintiffs' knowledge
requirement for claim accrual).
100 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2671-2680 (2006); 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-.11 (setting out detailed
requirements from Attorney General for FTCA claims).
101 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing technical steps of filing an FTCA
claim).
102 See Rakes v. United States, 442 F.3d 7, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding some instances require
consideration of injury as single episode, while others require separate determinations).
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In Rakes, the court discussed the different treatments in claim
accrual analysis by the First Circuit in McIntyre and Callahan.103 The
court concluded that different treatment is appropriate in certain situations,
and it cautioned that the evaluation made in McIntyre and Callahandid not
establish a generally applicable rule for all legal theories. °4 Instead, it held
that determining whether to evaluate different legal theories, or whether to
rely on the 5 earliest accruing theory, requires a circumstantial
10
determination.
The accrual date in Callahan occurred when information critical to
either of the plaintiffs' theories of FBI liability emerged. 10 6 In McIntyre,
the claim accrual date occurred when information emerged that supported
one of the claimant's legal theories. 0 7 The court did not consider whether
information existed that would make the other theory accrue. 10 In Rakes,
the court reasoned that it will treat a claimant with several theories of
liability as having sufficient knowledge for all theories, even if that
claimant only has sufficient knowledge for one.10 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF CLAIM ACCURAL
MEASUREMENT ON THE FTCA CLAIMS PROCESS
The FTCA provides claimants with the means of accusing a
government agency of tortious conduct, and, therefore, if one of the
claimant's theories of government agency liability begins to accrue, the
claimant has support for his or her claim. 110 If Congress intends to provide
individuals with a device to sue a government agency, finding that one
viable legal theory accrues for purposes of filing a claim satisfies the goal
103

Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20-21 (recognizing "threshold question" of working with multiple

legal theories).
104 Id. at 21 (reexamining methods of evaluation used in past cases with differently presented
legal theories).
105 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 21; see also Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 625 (1st Cir.
2011) (confirming case-by-case approach announced inRakes).
106 See Callahan v. United States, 426 F.3d 444, 452 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating claim accrues if
any causal connection exists). In Callahan, the court stated that "[p]utting forth a specific theory
of causation based on particular facts does not help a plaintiff, because only the earliest theory of

causation matters for accrual analysis." Id.

107 See McIntyre v. United States, 367 F.3d 38, 54 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding facts not
discoverable for first theory until after date that would bar claim).
108 See id. at 54 n.6 (passing on determination of when plaintiff's second theory accrued).
109 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 21-22 (finding Rakes claims accrued more than two years before

they filed administrative claims).
110See Callahan,426 F.3d at 452 (focusing on importance of knowing facts with "any causal
connection' to plaintiff's injury and government); supra note 10 and accompanying text
(discussing function and authority of FTCA).
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of holding the agency liable."'
Making circumstantial determinations according to the relevant

facts of a particular case may benefit claimants because of the individual
attention and evaluation the court engages in when considering claims."
However, the court's consideration of the legal theory or theories asserted
in the claimant's FTCA complaint to ascertain the claim accrual can affect
whether the claimant can sue the government." 3 The application of the
claim accrual analysis should either adhere to a specific rule, or it should
individually4 consider multiple theories of liability asserted by the FTCA
claimant."
In Rakes, the First Circuit reasoned that a court's calculation of an
accrual date through legal theory or theories "depends very much on the
circumstances of the case."" 5 The string of FTCA cases against the FBI
for their involvement with informants Bulger and Flemmi involve a large
body of common facts concerning the illicit relationship between the FBI
and its informants." 6 Although each circumstance is unique for specific
reasons, a group of claims exist that all stem from liability of the FBI's
involvement with Bulger and Flemmi during a specific time period that led
to the murders and injuries of innocent individuals.117 Questions of liability
do not appear to exist in any of the cases discussed, as evidenced by the
court's findings that the information available to claimants would provide
knowledge of government liability and the indication to file a claim to meet
the accrual date."' If an FTCA claimant knows that the court will evaluate
111 See supra note 10 (quoting statutory language from 28 U.S.C. § 2674 about government
liability).
112 See McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 54 (applying claim accrual analysis to only first theory because
it appears predominant theory).
113 See Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452 (dismissing plaintiff's second theory of liability which
would allow later accrual date than first theory); see also Rakes, 442 F.3d at 20-21 (refusing to
conduct accrual analysis for three theories of liability).
114 Compare McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 54 (analyzing one of the plaintiff's theories under claim
accrual), with Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452 (considering first theory to establish requisite causation
the only relevant theory).
115 442 F.3d at 21; see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (explaining Rakes court's
reasoning on the consideration of legal theories).
116 See Donahue v. United States, 634 F.3d 615, 616-21 (1st Cir. 2011); Rakes, 442 F.3d at
11-14 (describing prehistory of FBI's relationship with Bulger and Flemmi and actual extortion
event); Callahan, 426 F.3d at 446-48 (describing FBI's relationship with Winter Hill gang and
Callahan's death); McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 42-52 (providing factual background relevant to
McIntyre and Wheeler's murders concerning FBI, Bulger and Flemmi).
117 See supra note 116 (identifying record of common facts among different FTCA
claimants).
118 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 24 (deciding Rakes and Dammers should have been aware
government caused their injury); Callahan, 426 F.3d at 452-53 (finding sufficient facts plaintiff
reasonably should have known to inquire and seek advice); McIntyre, 367 F.3d at 58 (concluding
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the theory or theories of liability in a certain way, that claimant can attempt
to effectively fashion the theory of liability to his or her advantage, rather
than allow the court to determine which theory it wishes to use to measure
claim accrual. 119
Due to the tedious procedural steps of FTCA administrative claim
process, the role of the court in determining the sufficiency of an FTCA
claim may ultimately bar the claimant from seeking any consideration,
recovery, or determination of the alleged government liability. 120 Judge
Torruella's dissenting opinion in Donahue highlights the issue by focusing
on the implications of the way the court determines accrual dates of FTCA
claims. 121 Using a case-by-case analysis, and considering the specifics of
the claims by the Donahue and Halloran estates, Judge Torruella found the
claims not similarly situated to those in McIntyre and Callahan.22 In
McIntyre and Callahan, no individuals were charged for the murders, and
public perception considered Bulger the prime suspect; in Donahue, the
Suffolk County District Attorney prosecuted a suspect, James Flynn, for
the Halloran and Donahue murders in 1985.123 A jury acquitted Flynn in
1985.124

Tension exists between the practical operation of the FTCA and the
need to adhere to a statute of limitations, and how such an adherence will
ultimately require additional litigation of FTCA administrative claims. 25

Wheelers had sufficient notice of facts to begin claim accrual).
119 See Rakes, 442 F.3d at 21 (holding method of evaluating FTCA theories requires
circumstantial determination).
120 See supra note 49 (explaining how courts must make determinations as to procedural
compliance with FTCA statutory requirements).
121 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 633-34 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (discussing implications of
majority's evaluation of accrual date).
122 See id.at 633 (finding Halloran and Donahue families had reasonable belief that murderer
identified in May 1982). Torruella points out that "[p]rior to the initiation of these lawsuits, the
victims' families were told by those investigating the murders, to the extent they were told
anything at all, that Flynn was responsible." Id.In opinions concerning the First Circuit's denial
of rehearing en banc, the dissenting judges further note the lack of reasonableness in the
majority's finding of the accrual date of September 2, 1998. See Donahue v. United States, 660
F.3d 523, 529 (1st Cir. 2011) (Lipez, J., dissenting). Judge Lipez notes that the "critical
infornation" relied upon by the majority to determine the claim accrual date consisted of
"information that was generally available at the time of the Salemme hearings." See id.(quoting
Donahue, 634 F.3d at 625). Judge Lipez points out that only the Donahue decision relies upon
this information as the sole basis for finding knowledge on the part of the claimants. See id.
123 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 632-33 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
124 See id. at 619 (majority opinion); see also id.
at 634 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (reasoning
not reasonable for claimants to believe Flynn innocent after acquittal).
125 See id. at 629 (majority opinion) (highlighting reasons for enforcing statute of limitations
and applying legal rules evenhandedly); id.at 638 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (warning against
premature filing of claims because of issues with pleading requirements and ethical obligations).
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The legislature intended to use the administrative claims process to avoid
unnecessary litigation. 126 However, it appears that some courts advocate
filing claims with only "sufficient information for the agency to investigate
the claims.' 2 7 Filing claims earlier may relieve courts from determining
when claims accrue, but it will likely lead128 to an overwhelming number of
administrative claims filed with agencies.
Encouraging an earlier filing of administrative claims may
ultimately help alleviate the court of making determinations about
procedural issues of the FTCA administrative claim procedure. 129 If
claimants file at an earlier date, the agency will determine whether to settle
the claim or give the claimant the option to file suit in court. 30 While this
approach would reduce the litigation of procedural elements before the
court, it would likely increase the number of claims filed with agencies,
and may force agencies to litigate claims due to the high volume filed.' 3 '
Such an approach does not allow the agency to fully handle the 3case
in the
2
six month period prior to the claimant filing suit in federal court.
V. CONCLUSION
The most effective action in avoiding procedural issues with the
FTCA statute of limitations and accrual date is to file an administrative
claim at the claimant's earliest suspicion of government liability or
wrongdoing. Courts will likely consider legal theories asserted in the
administrative complaint all together; thus, if the claimant asserts multiple
theories, the first theory to accrue will determine the accrual date for all
remaining theories.

126

See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to encourage

settlement between claimants and agencies instead of involving federal courts).
127

Skwira v.United States, 344 F.3d 64, 81(1st Cir. 2003); see Donahue, 634 F.3d at 627

(majority opinion) (explaining Skwira 's standard that "irrefutable proof of the government's
accountability" not required to file administrative claim). The majority in Donahue reiterates that
"it is enough to have 'possession of sufficient information for the agency to investigate the
claim."' Id.at 627 (quoting Skwira, 344 F.3d at 81).
128 See Donahue, 634 F.3d at 627 (suggesting claimants who file early can continue
investigating for more information supporting alleged government liability); see also supra note

28 and accompanying text (discussing agency interest in receiving administrative claims directly).
129

See supra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining rising necessity to litigate

procedural requirements of FTCA).
130 See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining administrative agency makes initial
disposition of FTCA administrative claim).
131 But see supra notes 30, 32 (explaining Congress's belief agency interest and expertise

handling claims as reason for initial agency control).
132

But see supra notes 30, 32.
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While the initial purpose for the FTCA claims process prescribed
by Congress intended to alleviate the burdens on the courts concerning
potential suits, ironically, determinations about the procedural requirements
of the FTCA flood the federal courts. The existing structure for claims
under the FTCA appears to place more responsibility on the courts to
determine and enforce procedural requirements of filing a claim against an
administrative agency. Specifically, within the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, it appears that the court advocates the earlier filing of
administrative complaints under the FTCA with agencies like the FBI. If
practiced, earlier filing may avoid much of the procedural litigation
concerning the statute of limitations and claim accrual dates. The FTCA
procedure would likely exist as a process between the claimant and the
administrative agency, which would further the initial intentions of
Congress by requiring claims filed directly with agencies for agency
disposition and handling. Despite the danger in agency overload, earlier
filing also would likely permeate through and cause the extinction of the
litigation of the procedural requirements of the FTCA.
CaitlinA. Romasco

